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Non-technical summary
Resale price maintenance (RPM) arises when a manufacturer fixes the price at which
retailers resell the manufacturer’s products. There is wide consensus among policymak-
ers and economists that RPM can facilitate collusion among manufacturers and among
retailers. RPM can also be used by a manufacturer to exclude more efficient rivals.
Yet the US Supreme Court overturned the long standing per-se illegality of minimum
RPM with the Leegin decision of 2007. Courts now have to judge minimum RPM under
the rule of reason. On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Commission decided to
keep minimum and fixed RPM as core restrictions of competition in the renewed vertical
block exemption of 2010, but the guidelines now specify when minimum RPM may be
legal.
The dominant efficiency defense both in Leegin and the European guidelines are ser-
vice incentives: A manufacturer uses minimum RPM to provide retailers with the appro-
priate incentives for socially desirable services that would be under-provided with price
competition. The economic foundation of this argument rests on models with a single
manufacturer. Yet in many RPM cases, including Leegin, competing manufacturers sell
through common retailers.
With this paper, we shed light on the effects of RPM when competing manufacturers
sell their products through common retailers who provide sales services. We set up a
model which shows that if the competitive retail margins are low, each manufacturer
fixes a minimum price to induce favorable retail services. With symmetric manufacturers,
products are equally profitable in equilibrium and no product is favored, as without
RPM, but retail prices are higher. We show that minimum RPM can create a prisoner’s
dilemma for manufacturers without increasing and possibly even decreasing the overall
service quality.
Competition policy has to distinguish between cases in which externalities yield an
insufficient level of retail services and cases in which the service level is sufficient or
even better without RPM. The danger is that competition policy relies too much on the
established service arguments with a single manufacturer, which suggest that minimum
RPM increases efficiency. Within our model, raising retail margins of only one product
through minimum RPM indeed induces retailers to allocate more services to that product.
Hence a manufacturer can demonstrate that minimum RPM is effective in increasing
services for its product. However, if our model applies, minimum RPM does not induce
any efficiency gains in equilibrium, but increases retail prices and can even decrease the
quality of service.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Bei vertikaler Preisbindung legt der Hersteller den Preis fest, zu dem die Händler sein
Produkt weiterverkaufen. Unter Wettbewerbsökonomen ist bekannt, dass dies Kollusion
zwischen Herstellern sowie Händlern begünstigen kann. Auch kann ein Hersteller vertikale
Preisbindung einsetzen, um effizientere Rivalen vom Absatzmarkt abzuschotten.
Dennoch hat der Oberste Gerichtshof der Vereinigten Staaten das Verbot vertikaler
Fest- und Mindestpreisbindung mit der Leegin Entscheidung von 2007 aufgehoben und
durch die Vernunftsregel (rule of reason) ersetzt, so dass nun fallweise über ihre Zulässig-
keit entschieden wird. Die Europäische Kommission hat inzwischen entschieden, die Fest-
und Mindestpreisbindung in der 2010 aktualisierten Vertikalen Gruppenfreistellungsver-
ordnung weiterhin als Kernbeschränkungen des Wettbewerbs zu definieren. Jedoch nennt
der neue Leitfaden nun ausdrücklich Fälle, in denen vertikale Preisbindung legal sein
kann.
Die dominierende Effizienzverteidigung sowohl in der Leegin Entscheidung als auch im
Leitfaden sind Anreize zu Händlerdienstleistungen: Ein Hersteller nutzt vertikale Mindest-
preisbindung um verkaufsfördernde Händlerdienstleistungen anzubieten, die sozial wün-
schenswert sind und bei Preiswettbewerb zwischen den Händlern ungenügend angeboten
würden. Allerdings basiert die ökonomische Fundierung dieses Arguments auf Modellen
mit einem Hersteller, während in vielen Fällen vertikaler Preisbindung konkurrierende
Hersteller Produkte über dieselben Händler vertreiben.
In diesem Papier analysieren wir daher den Fall konkurrierender, gleichartiger Her-
steller mit gemeinsamen Händlern, die verkaufsfördernde Dienstleistungen wie Produkt-
beratung anbieten. Wir zeigen anhand eines Modells, dass Hersteller dann Mindestpreise
festlegen, wenn die Händlermargen bei Preiswettbewerb niedrig sind. Wenn die Hersteller
gleichsam Preisbindung verwenden, dann sind die Produkte schließlich auch gleich profi-
tabel und werden gleichmäßig mit verkaufsfördernden Maßnahmen ausgestattet. Jedoch
sind die Verbraucherpreise höher als ohne Preisbindung, während die Qualität der ver-
kaufsfördernden Maßnahmen niedriger sein kann. Wir zeigen zudem, dass die Möglichkeit
vertikaler Preisbindung für die Hersteller kollektiv gewinnmindernd sein kann.
In der Wettbewerbspolitik sollte genau zwischen Fällen unterschieden werden, bei de-
nen ohne Preisbindung zu wenige Händlerdienstleistungen angeboten werden, und Fällen,
in denen genug und möglicherweise sogar bessere Dienstleistungen ohne Preisbindung an-
geboten werden. Wir sehen eine Gefahr darin, dass die Wettbewerbspolitik sich zu stark
auf die etablierten, sogenannten Service-Argumente stützen könnte, die nahelegen, dass
vertikale Mindestpreisbindung die Effizienz steigert. Bemerkenswerterweise führen in un-
serem Modell durch Preisbindung gestiegene Händlermargen eines Produktes dazu, dass
die Händler diesem Produkt mehr verkaufsfördernden Maßnahmen zukommen lassen und
es mehr verkaufen. Einseitig betrachtet kann ein Hersteller somit demonstrieren, dass
Preisbindung effizienzsteigernde Effekte hat. Möglicherweise werden jedoch nur Händler-
dienstleistungen von Produkten mit geringen zu denen mit hohen Margen verschoben und
die Verbraucherpreise steigen, ohne dass die Qualität der Händlerleistungen zunimmt.
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1 Introduction
There is a long controversy on whether resale price maintenance (RPM) should be legal.
Although it is established that RPM facilitates collusion,1 the US Supreme Court over-
turned the long standing per-se illegality of minimum RPM with the Leegin decision of
2007.2 Courts now have to judge minimum RPM under the rule of reason. In the EU,
minimum and fixed RPM are still core restrictions of competition, but the guidelines now
specify when minimum RPM may be legal.3
The dominant efficiency defense both in Leegin and the European guidelines are service
incentives: A manufacturer uses minimum RPM to provide retailers with the appropri-
ate incentives for useful services that would be under-provided under price competition.
Examples include shopping time reduction (Winter, 1993), quality certification (Marvel
and McCafferty, 1984) and sales advice (Telser, 1960). These models focus on a sin-
gle manufacturer, although we often observe minimum RPM at retailers carrying many
brands of products such as books, clothing, contact lenses, hearing devices and household
appliances.4 Retailers of such products frequently offer services such as pre-sales advice
and product positioning. Interestingly, several observers have stated that the established
service arguments often do not apply in RPM cases.5 Note that when retailers carry
products of several manufacturers, a single manufacturer should have little incentives to
use minimum RPM to finance retail services which benefit all manufacturers.
In this paper, we rationalize that minimum RPM may be used by competing manu-
facturers to divert retail services even when the overall service level of retailers cannot be
affected. Note that for a fixed overall level of services, retailers should have incentives to
allocate sales services more to those products on which they earn the highest margins. For
example, the sales agent of a retailer, when approached by a consumer for sales advice,
has to decide which product to present to the consumer. Although matching the con-
sumers with on average less suitable products decreases overall sales, high retail margins
on actual sales can outweigh this loss. In turn, each manufacturer has an incentive to use
1See Marvel and McCafferty, 1984; Jullien and Rey, 2007; Rey and Verge, 2010. RPM can also be used
by a manufacturer to exclude more efficient rivals (Asker and Bar-Isaac, 2011 and references therein).
2Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S., 2007. Minimum RPM implies that
retailers may not sell below a specific price.
3Cf. Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 (2010), Article 4a and the EU Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints (2010/C 130/01); Paragraph 223 of the guidelines states that an efficiency defense in terms
of Article 101,3 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) is possible also for minimum
and fixed RPM. Par. 224 and 225 contain examples of potentially detrimental and beneficial practices.
4See Elzinga and Mills (2009) for a discussion of services in the Leegin case. Other recent RPM cases
with common retailers and products where pre-sale advice potentially matters include contact lenses (cf.
fine “Bußgeldbescheid B 3 - 123/08,” German Federal Cartel Office, September 2009), hearing devices
(press release “Bundeskartellamt verhängt Bußgeld gegen Hörgerätehersteller Phonak GmbH,” German
Federal Cartel Office, October 2009.), and household appliances (cf. press release “Bundeskartellamt
verhängt Bußgelder wegen unzulässiger Preisbindung,” German Federal Cartel Office, 2003).
5Grimes (2009) states that “there has, in fact, been no case before the Supreme Court in which free
riding was established as the motivation or justification for imposing RPM”. Also see Supreme Court
Judge Breyer (cf. fn. 2), Pitofsky (1984), SCHERER and ROSS (1990), pp. 551–552, and Klein (2009).
Grimes (2009) points out that “an anticompetitive effect of RPM that has thus far escaped mention by
the Supreme Court is its association with promotion that exploits consumer information gaps and, not
infrequently, is misleading or fraudulent”.
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minimum RPM to ensure high retail margins on its products and thereby increase their
sales.
We set up a model with two symmetric manufacturers who sell through two common
and symmetric retailers. The retailers allocate services among the products. First, we
hold each retailer’s overall service level fixed and assume that manufacturers do not com-
pete directly for consumers, but only indirectly for favorable retail services. We show
that if retail price competition is strong, each manufacturer fixes a minimum price to
induce favorable services. This occurs even when only linear tariffs are feasible, so that a
manufacturer cannot extract retail rents with a franchise fee.
Service is allocated evenly in equilibrium, just as without RPM. The retail prices are
higher because with minimum RPM a manufacturer directly controls the retail margin
and thus can incentivize favorable services without lowering its wholesale price. This
exercise illustrates that minimum RPM may be used to boost sales services even though,
by construction, the overall service level cannot increase.
Although total industry profits increase with minimum RPM, direct control can col-
lectively hurt the manufacturers because competition for favorable services intensifies.
Indeed, with linear wholesale tariffs and linear demand, minimum RPM implies a reduc-
tion in manufacturers’ profits and benefits retailers. Nevertheless, manufacturers have
individual incentives to use minimum RPM, which implies a prisoner’s dilemma. On the
contrary, maximum RPM - which manufacturers use if retail price competition is weak
- increases both the manufacturer profits and consumer surplus, but decreases the retail
profits.
In a second step, we allow each retailer to initially invest in the level of its matching
services. Investing more yields more precise information about which product suits which
consumer. Conventional wisdom suggests that if retailers need to invest in services, the
service level should be higher because minimum RPM increases the retail margins. Con-
trarily, although sales are more profitable for a retailer, we find that equilibrium service
investments are lower with minimum RPM. The reason is that retailers have ex-ante in-
centives to be uninformed about consumer preferences over the products, as this makes
products more exchangeable from the retailers’ perspective. Being more exchangeable
induces the manufacturers to compete harder for favorable services and thus to offer more
attractive tariffs to the retailers. With RPM, manufacturers compete more directly for
favorable services. Thus retailers have stronger incentives to be uninformed when RPM
is used, and invest less in matching precision.
In a third step, we allow for asymmetry by introducing a third manufacturer who offers
a perfect substitute to one of the other manufacturers’ products. As a consequence, only
one manufacturer has market power, and only this manufacturer can effectively use RPM.
The resulting asymmetric use of RPM tends to increase the asymmetry in margins and
thus services. If retailers are close substitutes, consumers are inefficiently often matched
with the high priced product. A ban on RPM can reduce this distortion.
Competition policy has to distinguish between cases in which externalities yield an
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insufficient level of retail services and cases in which the service level is sufficient or
even better without RPM. The danger is that competition policy relies too much on the
established service arguments with a single manufacturer, which suggest that minimum
RPM increases efficiency. Within our model, raising retail margins of only one product
through minimum RPM indeed induces retailers to allocate more services to that product.
Hence a manufacturer can demonstrate that minimum RPM is effective in increasing
services for its product. However, if our model applies, minimum RPM does not induce
any efficiency gains in equilibrium, but increases retail prices and can even decrease the
quality of service.
For example, in the Leegin case competing manufacturers of women apparel sold
through common retailers. Elzinga and Mills (2009) defend Leegin’s use of minimum
RPM by stating that »Leegin’s policy bears none of the marks of those economic theories
of RPM that have anti-competitive effects«. Elzinga and Mills (2009) even emphasize
the role of sales associates in the retailing of specialty apparel.6 With this paper, we
contribute a theory of how minimum RPM, when used to increase sales services, can hurt
all consumers - and even the manufacturers.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to the literature on service and RPM in the context of a single
manufacturer. These arguments are based on positive service externalities. A retailer
fails to take into account the positive effects of its services on the manufacturer’s profits
(Winter, 1993). Moreover, each retailer provides too little service if other retailers benefit
from these services (Telser, 1960). A single manufacturer can mitigate these coordination
failures by imposing RPM. It is acknowledged that a manufacturer optimizes services with
respect to marginal consumers (Schulz, 2007). Nevertheless, it is often argued that the
single manufacturer’s interest with respect to margins and services of exclusive retailers
are broadly aligned with the interests of an average consumer and thus total surplus. For a
recent discussion see Winter (2009).7 We depart from the single manufacturer assumption
and focus on the case of common retailers.
Our understanding that retailers can steer demand to more profitable products is
related to the literature on product advice. Raskovich (2007) considers a setting with
two manufacturers and a single retailer who provides product (existence) information.
Raskovich assumes that manufacturers fully control retail margins, i.e., use RPM. Manu-
facturers compete in margins since the retailer has an incentive to inform consumers about
high margin products rather than low margin products. He concludes that matching com-
petition clauses may dampen competition. In Inderst and Ottaviani (2011), consumers
6Elzinga and Mills (2009) quote Bear Stearns Equity Research with “[I]t is critical that sales associates
know the merchandise, have an understanding of the tastes and preferences of the target customer, and
can offer fashion and wardrobing advice.”
7Several articles study RPM in the context of spillovers in case of stock-outs (Deneckere et al., 1997,
1996; Krishnan and Winter, 2007; Wang, 2004). Wang actually has two manufacturers, but competitive
exclusive retailers and finds that total surplus increases with RPM.
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shop for an experience good and have to rely on a single adviser. The adviser offers two
products of two different firms and is paid by the firms through sales commissions. The
firms compete in sales commissions to influence the advice and thereby boost demand.
Inderst and Ottaviani find that commissions are higher when they are not disclosed, but
that disclosure may lead to an inefficiently small market share of the more efficient prod-
uct provider. As the adviser cannot set the retail prices, their setting is similar to our
case where firms use RPM.8
These articles share with our paper that the matching advice offered by a retailer to
customers is influenced by the products’ profitabilities. However, these articles do not
consider price competition between retailers and the incentives of a manufacturer to relax
this competition by using RPM. The core of the present paper is the analysis of competing
manufacturers’ individual incentives to use RPM and the effects of RPM compared to a
situation in which RPM is not feasible.
We are aware of two articles that also analyze RPM in a setting with differentiated
manufacturers and common retailers, but neither considers service. Rey and Verge (2010)
show that the monopolization result of Bernheim and Whinston (1985) with a common
retailer and two-part tariffs offered by manufacturers can be extended to competing com-
mon retailers if manufacturers can use RPM. Their result relies on efficient two-part
tariffs.9 In addition, they point out that with two-part tariffs, common agency equilib-
ria often fail to exist. Dobson and Waterson (2007) analyze bilateral Nash-bargaining
between each manufacturer-retailer pair over a linear wholesale price. They find that if
retailers have all the bargaining power, retail prices are higher with RPM. If, instead,
manufacturers possess all the bargaining power, retail prices are higher without RPM
because of double marginalization. Due to the model’s complexity, Dobson and Waterson
do not compare cases with intermediate bargaining power and do not analyze whether
manufacturers would like to use RPM.10
3 Model
3.1 Framework
Two symmetric, differentiated, single-product manufacturers (i = A, B) sell their prod-
ucts to two symmetric, differentiated retailers (k = 1, 2). Retailers provide product spe-
cific services such as pre-sale advice. Services are non-contractible. We first assume
that the overall service level, e.g., the number and skill of sales personnel used to ad-
vise consumers, is exogenous. Investments in the overall service level are endogenized in
8Moreover, Armstrong and Zhou (2011) show how a retailer affects the prominence of search goods.
Dziuda (2011) shows that a biased expert can use strategic argumentation to mislead clients searching
for the best match. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009a,b) analyze over-selling of a single product when re-
tailers provide multiple services and biased advice with only one strategic producer and two products,
respectively.
9Efficient means that rents can be extracted through up-front fees without a loss.
10Cf. Dobson and Waterson (2007), fn. 26.
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Subsection 4.1.
For a fixed overall service level, we analyze how service is allocated to the products on
offer. All costs of manufacturing and retailing are normalized to zero in this case.11 We
assume that more service allocated to product i increases the demand for this product
at both retailers. For a fixed overall service level, more service allocated to product i
implies a reduction in the service and thus demand for the other product, called −i. In
particular, each retailer chooses sk ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of services allocated to product
A. If the retailer favors product A (B), sk is greater (smaller) than 1/2; sk = 1/2 implies
that retailer k’s service is evenly distributed.
We assume that the allocation of services to products affects the maximal demand for
each product at both retailers. Mi is the maximal demand for product i and depends on
the service allocations of both retailers. Assume that demand for product i at retailer k
is twice continuously differentiable and has the functional form
Di,k ≡Mi(sk, s−k) di,k(pi,k, pi,−k). (1)
This demand structure allows us to separate the pricing of products from the service
decisions. Demand for product i only depends on the prices for that product at each
retailer, but not on the prices of the other manufacturer’s product. Thus, there is no
direct price competition between the manufacturers. This ensures that manufacturers’
strategic delegation of pricing to retailers à la Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and Rey and
Stiglitz (1995) does not drive our results. We occasionally suppress the arguments when
it is without loss of clarity and impose
Assumption 1. Mi is strictly concave with ∂MA∂sk > 0 >
∂MB
∂sk
and symmetric around 1/2:
Mi(s1, s2) = M−i(1− s1, 1− s2).12
The concavity and symmetry of Mi(s1, s2) imply that allocating services unevenly
to the two products reduces the aggregate MA + MB.13 The service choice sk affects
demand only through Mi. Hence, s1 and s2 affect both retailers symmetrically. This
serves tractability, as does
Assumption 2. There are no cross effects between retailers’ service allocations, in par-
ticular Mi = Mi,1 (s1) +Mi,2 (s2).
Moreover, demand for a product decreases when all its retail prices increase:
Assumption 3. ∂di,k
∂pi,k
< 0, ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
> 0 and |∂di,k
∂pi,k
| > ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
.
11Once service investments are endogenous the retailer must of course anticipate whether investment
costs can be recovered.
12Strict concavity is convenient but our results are also valid as long as aMi + bM−i is strictly quasi-
concave for a, b > 0 and s1, s2 ∈ (0, 1). Strict quasi-concavity follows naturally from our micro foundation
in Appendix B.
13The following assumptions on derivatives apply strictly only for the relevant range whereMi and di,k
are positive. Strict concavity ofMi in sk implies strict concavity ofMA+MB . By symmetry,MB(s1, s2) =
MA(1 − s1, 1 − s2). Thus ∂∂sk (MA(s1, s2) +MB(s1, s2)) = ∂∂sk (MA(s1, s2) +MA(1− s1, 1− s2)). This
derivative is zero at sk = 0.5. By strict concavity, this is the unique maximizer.
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As we assume service to be product specific, it is a form of special services discussed
by Telser (1960). For example, retailers may provide information to consumers about the
existence of the two products; each consumer only values one of the products and has
limited patience. Naturally, each retailer has an incentive to first present the product
which the consumer actually likes. If the retailer cannot say with certainty which product
the consumer prefers, the retailer has to base its decision on an estimate of the probability
that the consumer likes product A, and not B. When selling product A yields the same
retail profit as selling product B, the retailer will always first present the product that
is more likely to be valued by the consumer. Instead, if the products have different
profitabilities, the retailer will more often present the product with the higher profitability.
In Appendix B, we provide a more formal exposition of this example of sales services,
derive the properties of the demand function, and motivate the technical assumptions.
Similar to Mathewson and Winter (1984), we assume that consumers are ex-ante not
informed about the products, but know a product’s retail prices once they are informed
about it.
We are interested in the competitive effects of allowing the two manufacturers to
control retail prices. Two regimes are considered:
(i) RPM is not enforceable by any manufacturer,
(ii) RPM can be enforced by each manufacturer.
If manufacturer i restricts the retail price to pi, it must be maintained by both retailers.14
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Each manufacturer i ∈ {A,B} sets a uniform wholesale price wi, and optionally
fixes pi under regime (ii).
2. Each retailer k ∈ {1, 2} observes all the prices set by manufacturers, chooses the
service allocation sk, and sets its own retail prices pi,k. If RPM is enforced, pi,k is
restricted to pi.
3. Demand is realized.
Linear wholesale tariffs provide a clear-cut benchmark in which incentivizing retailers
is costly for the manufacturers. Other things equal, imposing minimum RPM when
additional rents can be extracted using up-front fees makes minimum RPM even more
attractive. Moreover, with linear tariffs we avoid non-existence problems as in Rey and
Verge (2010). Nevertheless, the logic of our arguments extends to non-linear contracts as
well, see Subsection 5.1.
The profit of manufacturer i is given by
pii ≡ wi
∑
k=1,2
Di,k, (2)
14We focus here on a symmetric treatment of the retailers, as is common in the literature on RPM.
Within the present setting, this is also optimal for the manufacturers.
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and the profit of retailer k by
Πk ≡
∑
i=A,B
(pi,k − wi)Di,k. (3)
To ensure that there is a unique equilibrium in the retailers’ pricing game, we impose that
the Hessian matrix of di,k has a negative and dominant main diagonal.
Assumption 4. ∂
2di,k
(∂pi,k)2 ≤ 0 ,
∂2di,k
(∂pi,−k)2 ≤ 0 ,
∂2di,k
∂pi,k∂pi,−k
≥ 0,
∣∣∣ ∂2di,k(∂pi,k)2 ∣∣∣ > ∂2di,k∂pi,k∂pi,−k .15
Now, we solve the game for subgame perfect Nash equilibria, first without and then
with RPM. We begin with a brief discussion of a simple benchmark case with exogenous
service allocations.
3.2 A benchmark with exogenous service allocations
Suppose for the moment that s1 and s2 are exogenous. As we assume that there is no
direct price competition between the products A and B, each manufacturer thus becomes
an upstream monopolist facing two retailers under imperfect competition. Let superscript
N denote equilibrium prices without RPM. Without RPM, a double marginalization
problem arises because the retail price pN lies above the monopoly price
pM ≡ arg max
p
∑
k
p di,k(p, p), (4)
which maximizes industry profits. Manufacturers have no reason to incentivize retailers
through positive margins as they cannot influence sales and a retailer’s outside option is
zero. Each manufacturer will consequently set its wholesale price equal to the monopoly
price and use a price ceiling to squeeze the retail margin to zero, i.e., wR = pR = pM ,
where superscript R denotes equilibrium prices with RPM.
In what follows, we assume that retailers can steer demand by using the service in-
struments sk, k ∈ {1, 2}. Thus the product demands become interdependent and manu-
facturers have to compete for favorable retail services.
3.3 Equilibrium without resale price maintenance (regime (i))
Assume that manufacturers can only set wholesale prices, but that no manufacturer can
use RPM. For given wholesale prices, each retailer chooses pA,k, pB,k and sk to maximize
Πk. We first solve for retail prices and service allocations of the retail subgame. The first
order condition (FOC) is
∂Πk
∂pi,k
= di,k + (pi,k − wi)∂di,k
∂pi,k
= 0. (5)
15The Assumptions 3 and 4 hold for example for the linear case, e.g. di,k = 1 − (β + γ) pi,k + γ pi,−k
with β, γ > 0.
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Note that (5) is independent of s1 and s2 as well as of the wholesale and retail prices of
product −i. Denote by p∗i (wi) the equilibrium retail price for product i and by
ϕ∗i (wi) ≡ (p∗i (wi)− wi) di (p∗i , p∗i )
its corresponding retail profitability. Weak concavity and the dominance of own price
effects of di,k (Assumption 4) imply that the pass through ∂p∗i /∂wi is below one. Hence
ϕ∗i decreases with wi.
Differentiating Πk with respect to sk yields the FOC
∂Πk
∂sk
= ∂Mi
∂sk
(pi,k − wi) di,k + ∂M−i
∂sk
(p−i,k − w−i) d−i,k = 0. (6)
Retailer k sets sk to shift demand towards the more profitable product. If the products are
equally profitable, the strict concavity and symmetry of MA and MB imply that sk = 1/2
is optimal. Intuitively, each retailer maximizes the matches MA + MB in this case. We
denote by s∗k(wA, wB) the equilibrium service decisions as a function of the wholesale
prices, by M∗i (wA, wB) ≡Mi (s∗1, s∗2) the corresponding maximal demands and summarize
in
Lemma 1. Without RPM, there exists a unique equilibrium in which both retailer deci-
sions are the same. In particular
1. p∗i is an increasing function of wi and independent of w−i and sk.
2. the retail profitability ϕ∗i (wi) decreases in wi.
3. an increase in wi decreases the equilibrium matches M∗i for product i.
4. for equal wholesale prices, service is allocated evenly, i.e., s∗k = 1/2.
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix A.
We can now turn to stage 1. To simplify notation, let d∗i (wi) ≡
∑
k di,k(p∗i (wi), p∗i (wi)).
Taking the retailer continuation equilibrium into account, a manufacturer’s demand in
stage 1 is given by M∗i (wi, w−i)d∗i (wi). Each manufacturer solves
max
wi
pii = wiM∗i (wi, w−i) d∗i (wi) , (7)
facing a tradeoff between price and quantity. An increase in wi increases the own margin,
but decreases demand in two ways: First, the retail price increases so that some of the
consumers attracted by services do not buy the product. Second, the retail profitability
decreases so that retailers allocate services away and thus attract fewer consumers to the
product as we show below.
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We derive the effect of wi on Mi at symmetric wholesale prices wN by differentiating
the retailer’s FOC (6) for sk and evaluating it at sk = s∗k and pi,k = p∗i (w):
∂M∗i
(
wN , wN
)
∂wi
= λ
∂ϕi
(
wN , wN
)
/∂wi
ϕi (wN , wN)
< 0. (8)
where
λ ≡ ∂Mi (
1/2, 1/2) /∂sk
Mi (1/2, 1/2)
× ∂Mi (
1/2, 1/2) /∂sk
−∂2Mi (1/2, 1/2) / (∂sk)2
> 0. (9)
The parameter λ is derived by collecting the effects of a change in wi through sk and s−k
on Mi at symmetric wholesale prices wA = wB. The first factor of λ measures the relative
shift in mass when sk is marginally changed at the point of symmetry. The second factor
measures the curvature ofMi at this point. The higher the second derivative is in absolute
value, the more total mass is lost for a given shift. Thus, λ measures the substitutability
of the products as perceived by the retailers when they allocate services. The larger λ is,
the more substitutable the products are, and the less total mass is lost for a given shift.
The mass Mi decreases more in the wholesale price wi, the larger λ is. This is because
a retailer’s opportunity costs of shifting demand decrease in λ such that its reaction to a
change in the relative profitabilities of the products becomes stronger. Substituting for
∂M∗i
(
wN , wN
)
/∂wi from (8) into the manufacturer’s FOC implied by (7) and applying
symmetry wA = wB = wN yields
wN = − di,k(p
N , pN)(∑
k
∂di,k
∂pi,k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ λ
(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
) (10)
with all derivatives evaluated at prices of wN and pN . The retail price is characterized by
pN = p∗i (wN) = wN −
di,k(pN , pN)
∂di,k(pN , pN)/∂pi,k
. (11)
In what follows, we restrict attention to demand functions that give rise to quasi-concave
reduced-form manufacturer profits and a stable equilibrium such that implicit differenti-
ation of the manufacturer FOCs can be applied.16
Proposition 1. Without RPM, the symmetric equilibrium is unique and characterized
by uniform wholesale prices of wN defined by (10), retail prices pN characterized by (11),
and service allocations s∗ = 1/2. An increase in λ reduces wN and pN , but increases the
retail profitability.
Intuitively, the more substitutable products are for a retailer, i.e., the higher λ is, the
more a retailer reallocates services in response to an increased profitability of a product.
16This is the case, for example, if di,k is linear in prices and MA is of the form
∑
k 2
(
sk − s2k/2
)
. For
a derivation of the latter, see the micro-foundation of demand in Appendix B.
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For λ = 0, products are not substitutable and the equilibrium is that of the benchmark
case in Section 3.2 where Mi is exogenous and a manufacturer acts as an upstream mo-
nopolist. As λ increases, manufacturer competition for favorable retail services drives
wholesale prices towards zero and increases the retailers’ profits.
3.4 Equilibrium with resale price maintenance (regime (ii))
In this subsection we first argue that if RPM is enforceable, both manufacturers will use
it. Recall from Proposition 1 that if no manufacturer can use RPM, the equilibrium
prices are wN and pN . A manufacturer who unilaterally introduces RPM can reproduce
the equilibrium prices without RPM by setting pRi = pN and wRi = wN and is thus at
least as well off as without RPM. Manufacturer i fixing both wi and pi faces the following
tradeoffs:
• increasing wi increases its own margin, but decreases the retail margin pi − wi and
thus induces retailers to allocate services away from that product;
• increasing pi increases the retail margin and thus retailers allocate more services to
product i. Yet a higher pi implies that an attracted consumer is less likely to buy
the product.
Given the two instruments (wi, pi), it is optimal for the manufacturer to enforce the
industry profit maximizing retail price pM . This price does not depend on the prices of
the other product because there is no direct price competition between manufacturers.17
Summarizing:
Lemma 2. Each manufacturer has an individual incentive to use RPM and fix a retail
price of pM .
The economic intuition behind Lemma 2 is that the manufacturer can use RPM to
maximize the joint rent from selling its product, and can use the wholesale price to
control the retail margin and thus service incentives. Without RPM, the manufacturer
can only use the wholesale price to control both retail incentives and overall profitability.
Since it is a manufacturer’s dominant strategy to use RPM and set the retail price at
the monopoly level, both manufacturers will do so in any equilibrium in which both use
RPM. The optimal wholesale price depends on the other product’s retail profitability as
this influences the service incentives. Focusing again on demands that give rise to interior
solutions, yields
Proposition 2. In the unique and symmetric equilibrium with RPM,
pR = pM , wR = p
M
1 + λ. (12)
Service is allocated evenly and the retail margin increases in λ.
17Otherwise, the retail price would be a function of the competitor’s retail price; see Subsection 5.2 for
this extension.
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Having characterized the equilibrium prices and service decisions under both regimes,
we now compare them to evaluate the effects of RPM on profits and welfare.
3.5 Competitive effects of resale price maintenance
For competition policy, an interesting question is whether RPM increases or decreases
retail prices. Comparing the implicit characterizations of pN and pR = pM yields
Lemma 3. The retail prices under RPM, pM , are higher than the prices when no manu-
facturer uses RPM, pN , if and only if
λ > λM ≡ −∂ di,k(p
M , pM)
∂ pi,k
/
∂ di,k(pM , pM)
∂ pi,−k
− 1. (13)
Correspondingly, RPM decreases retail prices if and only if the above inequality is re-
versed. For λ = λM , pN = pM .
The right hand side of (13) measures the intensity of retail competition. It is positive
as the own price effect dominates the cross price effect by Assumption 3. The left hand side
of (13) contains λ, the substitutability of products for the retailers and thus measures
manufacturer competition for services. With RPM, the retail price always equals pM ,
whereas without RPM, the retail price decreases both in the intensities of manufacturer
and retail competition. There is a critical level of λ, which we call λM , such that for a
given intensity of retail price competition, the retail prices with and without RPM are
equal. If competition at both levels is sufficiently intense, the price level without RPM is
lower than the industry profit maximizing price level pM , which results under RPM.
An important further question is whether minimum and maximum RPM can be dis-
tinguished with respect to their effects on retail prices and total surplus. We model RPM
as price fixing. However, if RPM imposes a binding constraint on retailers, it acts either
as a price floor or a price ceiling. For a given wholesale price, it is straightforward that
minimum RPM increases retail prices while maximum RPM decreases prices. However,
both wholesale and retail prices depend on whether RPM is used.
Minimum and maximum RPM can nevertheless be disentangled by answering the
question: Does a retailer benefit from reducing or from increasing its price relative to
the price imposed by the manufacturer? By evaluating a retailer’s marginal profit with
respect to its retail prices at the equilibrium values {wR, pR}, we obtain
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, manufacturers use minimum RPM if and only if λ > λM .
Manufacturers use maximum RPM if and only if λ < λM .
Corollary 1. Compared to the regime without RPM, minimum RPM always increases
retail prices and maximum RPM always decreases retail prices. The equilibrium allocation
of services is not affected by RPM.
To see why using minimum RPM is equivalent to an increase in the retail price, note
that at λ = λM , Lemma 4 implies p∗(wR) = pM , as no retailer has an incentive to
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deviate, whereas Lemma 3 implies pN ≡ p∗(wN) = pM . This implies wR = wN because
p∗(w) is strictly increasing in w. Without RPM, by an envelope argument, a marginal
increase in wi above wN = wR has no effect on the overall profitability of product i, as
p∗(wN) = pM . Thus, locally, a change in the wholesale price wi boils down to a tradeoff
between the manufacturer margin and the mass of demand Mi, which depends on the
retail profitability. This is the same tradeoff a manufacturer faces when fixing pi = pM
and setting wi. Hence at λ = λM , the equilibria with and without RPM coincide and
RPM is a superfluous instrument. When raising λ above λM , the wholesale prices both
with and without RPM decrease (Propositions 1 and 2). In turn, RPM implies a price
floor because each retailer individually prefers to set a price below pM . Analogously, for
λ < λM , wholesale prices increase and maximum RPM restricts the retail price to pM
because retailers individually prefer to raise prices further.
Corollary 1 suggests a simple optimal policy which is to forbid minimum RPM as it
unambiguously increases retail prices and leaves services unchanged. By construction,
symmetric increases in the retail profitabilities have no welfare effect as they do not affect
the overall service level that we have kept exogenous so far. This result provides a clear
benchmark that minimum RPM is harmful if the retail service level for this product
category is socially sufficient without RPM. In order to investigate the effects of RPM on
service efforts, we allow for service investments in the next subsection.
Are manufacturers better off when minimum RPM is enforceable? Recall that a
unilateral introduction of RPM is always weakly profitable for a manufacturer as it yields
direct control over the retail margin (Lemma 2). However, this additional control induces
manufacturers to compete harder for retail services. Collectively, manufacturers can thus
be worse off, even if industry profits increase through RPM. The next lemma defines this
case.
Lemma 5. The enforceability of RPM imposes a prisoner’s dilemma on manufacturers
when the equilibrium profit of a manufacturer under the regime (ii) with enforceable RPM
is lower than under the regime (i) without RPM. This is equivalent to wR di,k(pR, pR) <
wN di,k(pN , pN).
The inequality in Lemma 5 is independent of Mi because Mi is the same in any
symmetric equilibrium. For the case of minimum RPM we have established that pR > pN
(Corollary 1); because di,k decreases when both prices increase, di,k(pR, pR) < di,k(pN , pN).
Thus a sufficient condition for minimum RPM to lead to a prisoner’s dilemma is wR ≤ wN ,
i.e, that the manufacturer margin is weakly lower. Unfortunately, with only implicit
definitions of wR and wN , it is difficult to establish general conditions for wR ≤ wN . In
the next result, we use a linear parametrization of di,k to obtain
Proposition 3. If demand is linear in prices, banning minimum RPM is both in the
interest of consumers and manufacturers, whereas maximum RPM benefits these parties.
For retailers, the reverse holds.
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Without RPM, each manufacturer incentivizes retailers to divert services by reducing
the wholesale price. However, retailers partially pass the price reduction on to consumers.
This effect dampens manufacturer competition for the services of retailers. By contrast,
if manufacturers use minimum RPM, retailers cannot pass on the wholesale price reduc-
tion. Hence manufacturers compete more directly and thus more fiercely, yielding lower
wholesale prices with RPM. For linear demand, using minimum RPM is collectively never
in the interest of manufacturers.
A caveat applies as this result is derived for linear wholesale tariffs; with two-part
tariffs, the manufacturer can generally extract retail rents with an upfront-payment. Yet
with two-part tariffs, the manufacturer must ensure that the retailer prefers carrying its
product over exclusively carrying the other product. This tradeoff and thus the retailer’s
outside option to carrying the product generally depend on whether RPM is used in the
industry, hence it is an open question whether the dilemma ceases to exist. We further
elaborate on non-linear tariffs in Subsection 5.1.
4 Extensions
4.1 Investments in service quality
For a fixed overall service level, as assumed so far, a natural measure of a retailer’s
service quality is the mass of consumers that is successfully matched by the retailer,
i.e., Mi,k(sk) + M−i,k(sk). The equilibrium service quality does not depend on whether
RPM is enforceable because the service allocations are always undistorted in equilibrium
(s∗k = 1/2). Conventional wisdom suggests that minimum RPM incentivizes retailers to
invest more in service. We provide a counter example in which investment incentives of
retailers are reduced when manufacturers use minimum RPM.
Consider that retail service consists of providing information about the existence of
the products to consumers. Each consumer values only one of the products A and B.
Consumers are impatient: if the retailer first presents them with the product they do not
value, they do not buy any product. The retailer does not perfectly know which product
a consumer prefers. This micro-foundation is consistent with the demand function (1)
used in the main part.
In this subsection, we additionally allow the retailer to invest in obtaining better in-
formation on consumer preferences. For example, the retailer can train the sales agents
to be better informed about the products so that they know which product fits a given
consumer’s needs. Formally, each retailer’s information is expressed by a posterior prob-
ability q that a given consumer values product B and not A. Investment in information
affects the distribution of q, which we further specify below. We assume that retailers’
investments take place in an initial stage and become public information before manu-
facturers set prices. This assumption implies that manufacturers can change prices more
easily than retailer can change the service level.
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In what follows, we show that retailers invest less in service when manufacturers can
use RPM than when manufacturers cannot use RPM. The reason is that the more a
retailer invests, the better it is informed about each consumer’s preferences and the less
substitutable the products are when the retailer decides which product to present to a
given consumer.
Let us establish this argument more formally. The probability q that a consumer
values product B is distributed with G over [0, 1]. The information precision is captured
by the size of the mass points αk/2 at 0 and 1. Assume that the mass of each consumer
type at each retailer is one; hence αk represents the share of consumers of each type for
which the retailer knows the preferred product with certainty. To parametrize G, we
additionally assume that q is uniformly distributed in the interior (0, 1). The parameter
αk is thus the overall service level of a retailer: The higher αk is, the better a retailer can
match consumers to products. The mass of consumers successfully matched to product
A as a function of service levels and allocations is given by
Mi(α1, α2, s1, s2) ≡
∑
k∈{1,2}
αk + (1− αk) × 2×
(
sk − s2k/2
)
. (14)
The service allocation sk is the cut-off probability such that for higher q the consumer is
allocated to product B instead of A. See Appendix B for a derivation of (14). Note that
Mi increases in α1 and α2 as the last term of (14) is smaller than one because sk ∈ [0, 1].
Recall that retailers contribute to a pool of consumers Mi for each product.18 For
tractability, we maintain the assumption that manufacturers set uniform wholesale prices.
The subgame equilibrium prices
(
pN , wN , pR, wR
)
are only affected by αk through λ be-
cause Mi does not directly affect the pricing of the products. For any αk, k ∈ {1, 2},
equilibrium service allocations are s∗k = 1/2 as before. The relation between αk and λ is
given by
λ (α1, α2) ≡
∑
k
(1− αk) [∂Mi (1/2, 1/2) /∂sk]2
[αk + (1− αk) Mi,k(1/2, 1/2)]
[
−∂2Mi,k(1/2, 1/2)/ (∂sk)2
]
with ∂λ/∂αk < 0. The arguments of λ are suppressed from now on. Let M˜i(α1, α2) ≡
Mi(α1, α2, s1 = 1/2, s2 = 1/2). The equilibrium prices (with or without RPM) are denoted
by wl(λ) and pl(λ) with l = R,N . Each retailer solves
max
αk
Πk =
∑
i∈{A,B}
M˜i(αk, α−k) [(pl(λ)− wl(λ)) di,k(pl(λ), pl(λ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
retail profitability
]− C(αk),
where C(αk) denotes the investment costs as a function of the overall service level. We
assume that C increases in αk with C ′(0) = 0 and C ′(1) = ∞ and is sufficiently convex
to ensure unique solutions.
18This yields a public good problem among retailers, i.e., the well known free riding problem. Yet,
we do not elaborate on it here as it is not central for this argument. A more detailed analysis of how
consumers choose retailers providing matching advice is left for future research.
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Let us now inspect the tradeoffs a retailer faces when choosing αk: More precise in-
formation on consumer types increase M˜i and thus profits. As λ decreases in αk, the
wholesale prices increase with more precise information, both with and without RPM.
Thus even without investment costs, the retailer faces a tradeoff: Better information in-
creases successful matches and so demand, but it also decreases the retail profits earned on
each consumer as the equilibrium wholesale prices increase. By investing less in precision,
a retailer commits to perceive the products of the manufacturers as more substitutable,
which invites the manufacturers to compete harder.
In order to compare the equilibrium quality levels with and without RPM, we use that
q is uniformly distributed in (0, 1) and let di,k be linear in prices.19 Marginal profits dΠkdαk
are defined parametrically and we obtain
Proposition 4. If demand is linear and the uncertain information q is uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 1], the equilibrium service level α∗k, k ∈ {1, 2}, and in turn quality is lower
with RPM.
Intuitively, recall that the wholesale prices and hence retail profits depend on λ, which
measures the degree of substitutability of the products. The more substitutable the
products are, the higher is the retailer margin. By being less informed, the retailer
chooses a higher λ (more substitutability) and invites manufacturer competition. With
RPM, each manufacturer can directly control its product’s retail profitability by fixing
the retail margin and can therefore respond more effectively to a change in λ. Hence,
with RPM a higher λ is more valuable for a retailer. As λ decreases in αk, i.e. when the
retailer is more informed, each retailer invests less in information precision under RPM.
4.2 Asymmetric market power and resale price maintenance
Symmetric manufacturers and retailers are a useful benchmark to assess the effects of
RPM on prices and service levels. Moreover, it is insightful to consider manufacturers
with different degrees of market power. We find that in such cases RPM tends to further
distort the allocation of services.
Consider that there is one manufacturer of product A as before, but that now there
are two manufacturers of product B. Assume that a retailer’s allocation of service on
product B cannot be manufacturer specific as the products are identical. In our leading
example, this means that consumers who are informed about product B may buy the
product of either manufacturer of B. If RPM is ruled out, all three manufacturers only
set wholesale prices in the first stage. Bertrand competition between the manufacturers of
product B forces wholesale prices to zero. This implies a retail price of p∗(0) for product
B (Lemma 1). Manufacturer A earns positive profits by setting a positive wholesale price.
As the retail profitability decreases in a product’s wholesale price (Lemma 1), retailers
will steer demand to product B in equilibrium. Without RPM, retailers thus favor sales
of the competitive product B.
19See Appendix B for a derivation of this Mi.
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Now assume that RPM is feasible. Interestingly, the manufacturers of product B
cannot effectively use RPM. By contradiction, assume that both manufacturers offer tariffs
with wholesale prices of zero and a fixed retail price unequal to p∗(0), i.e., effectively use
RPM. This cannot be an equilibrium as a manufacturer of product B could profitably
offer a contract with a slightly positive wholesale price and let retailers choose the price.
Each retailer strictly prefers such an offer as it can play a best response to the other
retailer.
Lemma 6. In any equilibrium, wB = 0 and pB,1 = pB,2 = p∗(0). It is an equilibrium that
each manufacturer of product B offers wB = 0 and does not fix the retail price.20
Lemma 6 implies that the competing manufacturers for product B cannot effectively
use RPM. Hence the retail profitability on product B is not affected by the enforceability
of RPM.
The profitability of product A generally depends on whether manufacturer A uses
RPM. Faced with the same equilibrium prices on product B independent of whether
RPM is feasible, manufacturer A is clearly (weakly) better off when fixing the retail price.
With RPM, manufacturer A sets pA = pM to maximize the overall profitability on product
A (Lemma 2) and sets wA by trading off the own margin and retailers’ service incentives.
To understand the effects of RPM on prices and service allocations, consider two polar
cases: retail monopolies and fierce competition (i.e., very small retail margins). In case of
retail monopolies, the retail profitability is maximal on product B and strictly smaller on
product A as wA > wB = 0 and pA = pB = pM . Thus service is (still) excessively allocated
to product B, although excessive double marginalization on product A is eliminated. By
contrast, fierce retail competition implies that the profitability on product B is low and,
therefore, manufacturer A uses RPM to raise the retail margin and thereby profitability
of A over that of B. Hence service is allocated more to product A in equilibrium. In
this case, RPM raises the price level of product A and yields that services are allocated
excessively to the more expensive product.
Proposition 5. Assume that two manufacturers sell product B and one manufacturer
sells product A. If RPM is not enforceable, service is allocated more to product B than to
the more expensive product A. If RPM is enforceable and retailers are close substitutes,
product A is more expensive than product B and services are allocated more to product A.
The case with fierce retail competition and enforceable RPM exhibits that A is sold at a
high, manufacturer-maintained price and is favorably sold by retailers, whereas product B
is both less expensive and less endowed with services, e.g., is less advised or advertised. As
an example for the asymmetry in manufacturer market powers, one could interpret A as a
branded product and B as a private label which can be produced by several manufacturers.
Interestingly, the price-service differential (high price & high service vs. low price &
20Both manufacturers of B setting wB = 0 and fixing pB = p∗(0) is not necessarily an equilibrium
as one manufacturer could offer wB ≥ 0 and fix a much higher pB and possibly be accepted by both
retailers. In any case, there is no equilibrium in strictly mixed strategies with RPM.
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low service) is not caused by different product qualities (vertical differentiation), but by
asymmetric market power at the manufacturer level.
5 Discussion
In the previous section, we characterized the equilibria with and without RPM and de-
rived our main results under simplifying assumptions. In this section, we discuss the
consequences of allowing for non-linear upstream tariffs and direct price effects between
the products.
5.1 Non-linear upstream tariffs
We face the usual modeling tradeoff between linear and two-part tariffs. Whereas linear
tariffs are sometimes bilaterally inefficient within the model framework, the efficiency of
two-part tariffs rests on implicit simplifying assumptions such as no input arbitrage and
risk neutrality of retailers. Although it seems plausible that contracts involve non-linear
components such as rebate schemes, we believe that linear tariffs are often more reasonable
than fully efficient two-part tariffs.
By using linear tariffs, we also avoid to confound the service effects with the common-
agency effects pointed out by Rey and Verge (2010). These rely on two-part tariffs, as
manufacturers need to become residual claimants of industry-profits. Our results with
simple linear tariffs show that minimum RPM may even be used anti-competitively by
manufacturers if more complex tariffs are not feasible.
Another reason for using linear tariffs is tractability.21 In a symmetric equilibrium with
common retailers and manufacturers offering unconditional two part tariffs, each retailer
has to be indifferent between accepting one or both contracts, as otherwise each manufac-
turer could raise the upfront payment. Denoting the candidate contract by {w,F}, the
indifference condition becomes
∑
i
[
Mi(
1
2 ,
1
2) (p(w)− w)di,k(p, p)− F
]
= Mi(1, sd) (p(w)− w)d(p, p)− F.
The left hand side contains the profit of a retailer when both retailers carry both products.
The right hand side is the profit when the retailer only chooses one product, and retailers
allocate services correspondingly. To break the indifference, a manufacturer can keep the
upfront payment F and lower its marginal price wi slightly below w such that accepting
only this manufacturer is strictly preferred by the retailer over accepting both. A marginal
change thus induces a drastic reaction, which can destroy any candidate equilibrium. See
Rey and Verge (2010) for a more detailed discussion on the non-existence of common
agency equilibria in a similar setting. Conditional offers or menus of contracts may solve
21The assumption of linear wholesale contracts in a two-manufacturer-two-retailer framework is also
made by Dobson and Waterson (2007).
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this problem. However, such an investigation is out of the scope of this paper.22
Nevertheless, focus we conjecture that our main results also hold with two-part tariffs.
With two-part tariffs but without RPM, manufacturers can still not ensure high retail
margins in case of strong retail competition. In turn, manufacturers have an incentive to
reduce the wholesale margin in order to increase the retail profitability such that prices
below the monopoly level may result. With RPM and two-part tariffs, providing marginal
incentives is both feasible and costless as rents can be extracted via a fixed fee such that
monopoly prices should be implemented.
Our result that RPM imposes a prisoner’s dilemma relies on the assumption that a
manufacturer cannot fully extract additional retail rents caused by RPM through two-
part tariffs. However, note that in case of delegated agencies, also with two-part tariffs
manufacturers must leave rents to retailers as a retailer can always opt to only carry
one brand. A retailer’s tradeoff between accepting one and both manufacturer’s offers
generally depends on whether RPM is employed. Thus RPM may impose a manufacturer
dilemma even in case of fully efficient two-part tariffs.
5.2 Direct inter-brand price competition
The assumption of no cross price effects between products A and B simplified the previous
exposition, but is certainly not always realistic. One way to relax this assumption is to
assume that there is a fraction 1−δ of uninformed consumers and a fraction δ of informed
consumers.
An uninformed consumer only considers buying a product after being matched with
that product by a retailer, giving rise to demand di,k(pi,k, p−i,k)Mi(sk, s−k) as in the main
part. Assume that informed consumers know their match values with both products,
and that these values may both be positive. Hence the demand of an informed consumer,
denoted by hi,k(pi,k, pi,−k, p−i,kp−i,−k), depends on all four prices, but not on service. Total
demand is thus given by
Di,k = δ hi,k + (1− δ) di,kMi(s1, s2). (15)
A retailer’s service allocation as a function of prices is still characterized by Equation (6)
and thus remains unaffected. However, a retailer accounts for both hi,k and di,k when
deciding on a retail price pi,k and, therefore, considers the retail prices of product −i
which affect hi,k. Similarly, a manufacturer now faces direct price competition through
hi,k. The equilibrium prices are a convex combination of the equilibrium prices when all
consumers are informed (δ = 1) and when all are uninformed (δ = 0). By continuity
of the objective functions in δ, the results derived for δ = 0 in the main part remain
qualitatively valid at least for a sufficiently small, but positive δ.
Interestingly, another manufacturer dilemma may arise when the fraction of informed
22See Rey and Whinston (2011) on conditionality and menus when two retailers make offers to a single
manufacturer.
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consumers δ is large. As δ → 1, the additional demand which can be generated with
minimum RPM goes to zero. Instead, a manufacturer prefers maximum RPM to reduce
the retail margin which increases demand through hi,k and di,k. Maximum RPM is a
manufacturer’s dominant strategy in the present timing (cf. Subsection 3.4).
However, committing not to control retail prices via RPM may increase profits as
it can relax the manufacturers’ competition: Without RPM on product A, the retailers
may increase the price of product A in response to a cost increase of product B; such a
reaction induces manufacturer B to set higher prices. See Bonanno and Vickers (1988)
as well as Rey and Stiglitz (1995) who elaborate on strategic delegation of retail pricing
in the context of exclusive retailers. Abstracting from direct price competition avoids to
confound such effects with the effects of service competition.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the incentives of manufacturers to use RPM when they compete
for sales services provided by common retailers. A manufacturer can use RPM to protect
the retailers’ margins on its products to induce favorable services. Holding the overall
service level constant, we show that in equilibrium the competition of symmetric man-
ufacturers for retail services yields minimum RPM and higher retail prices. If retailers
can invest in the overall service level, we show that retailers may invest less if minimum
RPM is used, although retail margins are higher. In consequence, all consumers, and even
manufacturers, can be worse off.
Our model features two manufacturers and two common retailers, endogenous whole-
sale and retail prices, as well as endogenous service allocations and levels. As the analysis
of such a setting is inherently complicated when all four agents behave strategically, we
have imposed several simplifying assumptions. First, we have focused on linear wholesale
tariffs to avoid complications such as the non-existence of an equilibrium pointed out by
Rey and Verge (2010). Second, we have not allowed for direct price competition between
the competing products. Third, we have assumed that retailers contribute with their ser-
vices to a common pool of consumers who are informed about the prices at both retailers.
Although we have indicated that the assumptions can be relaxed without qualitatively
changing the results, a full fledged analysis under alternative assumptions is beyond the
scope of this paper, but appears promising for future research.
Service incentives are the major efficiency defense in favor of minimum RPM. In light
of our results, we believe that competition policy relies too much on the established
service arguments with a single manufacturer which - overall - suggest beneficial effects
of minimum RPM. Similar arguments in favor of restricting retail price competition to
ensure better consumer advice prevail in markets with complex products such as financial
and health services. With this paper, we contribute a theory of how minimum RPM
can hurt all consumers - and even manufacturers - in markets where manufacturers sell
through common retailers who provide sales services.
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Appendix A: Omitted proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. (1.) The FOC for the retail price is given by (5). The unique and
symmetric equilibrium price p∗i is defined by applying symmetry to (5). Implicit differen-
tiation yields 0 < ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
< 1, ∂p
∗
i
∂w−i
= 0.
(2.) ∂
∂wi
(ϕi,k) < 0 follows from ∂∂wi (p
∗
i − wi) < 0 and ∂∂pi (di,k (p∗i , p∗i )) < 0 (Assump-
tion 3) in combination with ∂
∂wi
(p∗i ) > 0.
(3.) From (1.), retail prices do not depend on sk. The equilibrium value s∗k is defined by
the FOC (6) evaluated at pi,k = p∗i (wi) ∀ i, k. By symmetry, s1 = s2 = s∗ in equilibrium.
Implicit differentiation of the definition of s∗k yields
ds∗k
dwi
= −∂
2Πk(p∗, p∗)
∂sk∂wi
/
∂2Πk
∂2sk
= −
(
∂ϕi,k
∂wi
∂Mi
∂sk
)
∂2MA
(∂sk)2 ϕA +
∂2MB
(∂sk)2 ϕB
. (16)
∂2Πk
(∂sk)2
< 0 holds as Mi is strictly concave. The sign of ds
∗
k
dwi
equals the sign of ∂2Πk
∂sk∂wi
=
∂Mi
∂sk
∂ϕi,k
∂wi
. From (1.), ∂ϕi,k
∂wi
< 0. From Assumption 1 ∂MA
∂sk
> 0 > ∂MB
∂sk
, hence, ds∗
dwA
< 0 and
ds∗
dwB
> 0. Thus ∂M
∗
i
∂wi
=
[
∂Mi
∂sk
+ ∂Mi
∂s−k
]
∂s∗
∂wi
< 0 as the term in brackets is positive for i = A
and negative for i = B.
(4.) wA = wB ≡ w implies equal retail price p∗A = p∗B and thus equal profitabilities
ϕA(wA) = ϕB(wB) ≡ ϕ. Hence s∗ = arg maxsk MA ·ϕ+MB ·ϕ = arg maxsk MA+MB = 0,
i.e. service is allocated evenly.
Proof of Proposition 1. Differentiating a manufacturer’s profit pii from (7) with respect
to wi yields the FOC
M∗i d
∗
i + wiM∗i
∂d∗i (wi)
∂wi
+ wid∗i
[
∂Mi
∂sk
∂s∗k
∂wi
+ ∂Mi
∂s−k
∂s∗−k
∂wi
]
= 0
with ∂d
∗
i (wi)
∂wi
= 2
(
∂
∂pi,k
(di,k(p∗i , p∗i )) + ∂∂pi,−k (di,k(p
∗
i , p
∗
i ))
)
∂p∗i (wi)
∂wi
. Evaluating the FOC at
wA = wB = wN , and correspondingly pA = pB = pN and s∗k = 0.5∀k as well as dividing
by 2Mi yields
di,k(pN , pN) + wN
[(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ di,k(p
N , pN)
Mi(0.5, 0.5)
(∑
k
∂Mi
∂sk
∂s∗k
∂wi
)]
= 0. (17)
Moreover, (16) simplifies to ds
∗
k
dwi
=
∂
∂wi
(ϕi,k)
ϕi
(
∂Mi
∂sk
)
/
(
− ∂2MA(∂sk)2
)
. Quasi-concavity of pii(wi)
implies that the above condition characterizes the equilibrium wholesale price. Solving
for wN and substituting for ds
∗
k(1/2,1/2)
dwi
yields
wN = −di,k(p
N , pN)(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ di,k · ∂ϕi,k∂wi /ϕi ·
(∑
k
(
∂Mi
∂sk
)2
/
(
−2 ∂2Mi(∂sk)2 Mi(0.5, 0.5)
)) , (18)
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Let λ ≡ ∑k (∂Mi(1/2,1/2)∂sk )2 / (−2∂2Mi(1/2,1/2)(∂sk)2 Mi(1/2, 1/2)) and use that di,k · ∂ϕi,k∂wi /ϕi = ∂di,k∂pi,k +
∂di,k
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
to reduce (18) to (10). Note that (9) follows from symmetry in k. Product
i’s retail profitability decreases in wi by Lemma 1. To see that dw
N
dλ
< 0, implicitly
differentiate the equilibrium FOC
∂pii
∂wi
= wN
{(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ λ
[
∂di,k(pN , pN)
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k(p
N , pN)
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
]}
+di,k(pN , pN) = 0
to obtain
dwN
dλ
= −∂
2pii
(
wN , wN
)
∂wi∂λ
/
∂2pii
(
wN , wN
)
∂wi∂wi
+
∂2pii
(
wN , wN
)
∂wi∂w−i
 .
Local stability implies ∂
2pii(wN ,wN)
∂w2i
+ ∂
2pii(wN ,wN)
∂wi∂w−i
< 0. Moreover,
∂2pii
∂wi∂λ
= wN
[
∂di,k(pN , pN)
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k(p
N , pN)
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
]
< 0
follows from Assumption (3) and 0 < ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
< 1 (Lemma 1). Thus ∂wN
∂λ
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. As argued in the main part, using RPM is a dominant strategy for a
manufacturer. Given wholesale and retail prices, each retailer chooses s′ = arg maxsk Πk.
Let ϕi,k(pi, wi) = (pi − wi)di,k(pi, pi). Implicit differentiation of ∂Πk/∂sk = 0 yields
∂s′
∂wi
=
(
∂Mi(s′, s′)
∂sk
di,k(pi, pi)
)
/
(
∂2Mi(s′, s′)
(∂sk)2
ϕi,k +
∂2Mi(−s′, s′)
(∂sk)2
ϕ−i,k
)
, (19)
and, analogously,
∂s
′
k
∂pi
=
(
∂Mi(s′, s′)
∂sk
∂ϕi,k
∂pi
)
/
(
∂2Mi(s′, s′)
(∂sk)2
ϕi,k +
∂2Mi(−s′, s′)
(∂sk)2
ϕ−i,k
)
. (20)
A manufacturer solves maxwi,pi pii = wiMi(sk, s−k)
∑
k di,k(pi, pi), taking the prices w−i
and p−i of the other product given. This yields the FOCs
∂pii
∂wi
= 2 di,k (pi, pi) Mi(s
′
k) + 2widi,k(pi, pi)
(
∂Mi(s′, s′)
∂sk
∂s′
∂wi
)
= 0, (21)
∂pii
∂pi
= 2wi
[(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
Mi(s
′
k) + 2 di,k(pi, pi)
(
∂Mi(s′, s′)
∂sk
∂s
′
k
∂pi
)]
= 0. (22)
Substitute from (19) and (20) in (21) and (22). Note that any linear combination of the
above FOC must be zero at the point of the optimal prices, hence ∂pii
∂wi
+ c ∂pii
∂pi
= 0∀c.
Setting c = pi/wi implies pi
(
∂di,k(pi,pi)
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k(pi,pi)
∂pi,−k
)
+ di,k(pi, pi) = 0. This is the FOC
implied by (4) which holds if and only if pi = pM .
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Proof of Proposition 2. pRi = pM follows from Lemma 2. Summing up the FOCs (21) and
(22) and imposing symmetry implies wR
(
∂di,k(pM ,pM)
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k(p
M ,pM)
∂pi,−k
)
(1 + λ)+di,k(pM , pM) =
0. Rearranging and noting that pM = −di,k(pM , pM)/
(
∂di,k(pM ,pM)
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k(p
M ,pM)
∂pi,−k
)
is im-
plied by (4) yields wR = pM1+λ . The wholesale price clearly decreases in λ as p
M is indepen-
dent of λ. For λ→∞, wR → 0 and for λ→ 0, wR → pM .
Proof of Lemma 3. The condition pN = pM implies a λ such that prices with and without
RPM are equal. Substituting for wN from (10) and (11), and for pM from the FOC
implied by (4), yields
−di,k(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
)
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ λ
(
∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
∂p∗i
∂wi
) + −di,k∂di,k
∂pi,k
= −di,k∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
.
Note that all expressions with di,k are evaluated at prices pM and ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
at wN . Isolating λ
yields
λ = −∂di,k(p
M , pM)/∂pi,k
∂di,k(pM , pM)/∂pi,−k
− 1 = λM . (23)
To see that λ ≷ λM implies pM ≷ pN , note that pM does not depend on λ, while wN
decreases in λ by Proposition 1 and ∂pN
∂wN
= ∂p
∗
i (w)
∂w
> 0 by Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. Strict concavity of Πk in pi,k (this follows from weak concavity of
di,k) implies that ∂Πk∂pi,k is monotone in pi,k. Consequently, if
∂Πk
∂pi,k
is positive (negative) at
pi,k = pi,−k = pM , each retailer wants to increase (decrease) its price and thus RPM acts
as maximum (minimum) RPM. Hence minimum RPM is equivalent to
∂di,k(pM , pM)
∂pi,k
(pM − wR) + di,k(pM , pM) < 0.
Add 0 = ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
pM − ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
pM on the left hand side of the above to obtain
∂di,k
∂pi,k
pM + pM ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
+ di,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0at pM
−wR∂di,k
∂pi,k
− pM ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
< 0.
Substitute wR = pM1+λ (Proposition 2) to get λ >
[
∂di,k(pM ,pM )
∂pi,k
/− ∂di,k(pM ,pM )
∂pi,−k
]
−1 = λM .
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Proof of Proposition 3. Let di,k = 1−(β+γ) pi,k+γ pi,−k with β, γ > 0. Hence ∂di,k∂pi,−k = γ,
∂di,k
∂pi,k
= −(β + γ), ∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
= −β. Let the subscript LIN denote prices of the linear
demand case. p∗i,LIN(w) is obtained from substituting the linear demand expressions into
(6) and letting pi,1 = pi,2 = p. This yields 1 − β p + γ p + (p − w)(−β) = 0. Hence
p∗i,LIN(w) =
1+w (β+γ)
2β+γ ,
∂p∗i
∂wi
= β+γ2β+γ , and d
∗
i (w)/2 = 1 − β 1+w (β+γ)2β+γ . Equilibrium prices are
obtained by plugging the linear-demand analogs into the reduced form expressions (4),
(10), (11), and (12). This yields wNLIN = 12β(1+λ) , p
N
LIN =
1+wN (β+γ)
2β+γ =
1
2β+γ (1 +
β+γ
2β(1+λ)),
pRLIN = pMLIN = 12β , and w
R
LIN =
pMLIN
1+λ =
1
2β (1+λ) . Note that w
N
LIN = wRLIN , i.e. the
wholesale price does not depend on the pricing regime. Thus the dilemma condition
wNdi,k(pN , pN) > wRdi,k(pM , pM) reduces to di,k(pN , pN) > di,k(pM , pM) which is true if
and only if pN < pM =⇒ β < λ2 as ∂di,k
∂pi,k
+ ∂di,k
∂pi,−k
= −β < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. If the marginal profit dΠk
dαk
with respect to αk is higher without
than with RPM, then the equilibrium service quality must be strictly higher without
RPM. For l = N,R the marginal profit is generally given by
∑
i∈{A,B}
∂M˜i
∂αk
(pl(λ)− wl(λ)) di,k(pl)− C ′(αk) + M˜i d
dαk
[(pl(λ)− wl(λ)) di,k(pl(λ), pl(λ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
retail profitability
].
(24)
Differentiating the retail profitability under RPM yields
d
dα1
{[pM · (1− 1/(1 + λ)] d(pM)} = pMdi,k(pM , pM) /(1 + λ)2 · dλ
dα1
.
In case of RPM, the retail price pM , and thus also di,k(pM , pM), is independent of λ. Hence
only the retail margin increases in λ. The derivative without RPM is given by
d
dα1
di,k(pN , pN)2
(
−∂di,k(p
N , pN)
∂pi,k
)−1 = d [di,k(pN , pN)2/(−∂pi,kdi,k(pN , pN))]
dpN
d pN
dλ
d λ
dα1
.
To determine which regime yields higher quality, we evaluate the sign of the difference
in marginal profits without and with RPM, i.e. dΠk
dαk
|No RPM − dΠkdαk |RPM at symmetric
investments (α1 = α2 = α). For this, substitute the equilibrium prices under linear
demand (derived from di,k = 1− (β + γ)pi,k + γpi,−k, β, γ > 0 in the proof of Lemma 3)
and λ, which equals (2−α1−α2)2/(4− 2α1− 2α2) (obtained from plugging Mi from (14)
in the definition of λ(α1, α2)). The difference in marginal profits for α1 = α2 = α, is then
given by
α(10− α)2(β + γ)
64(2β + γ)2
and straightforwardly shown to be positive for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, β > 0 and γ > 0.
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Appendix B: Micro foundation of service
In this extension, we motivate the assumptions imposed on the reduced-form demand in
Equation (1) by modeling retailers as matchmakers. The mass of consumers equals 4, so
that each product at each retailer is maximally demanded by a unit mass of consumers. A
consumer is of type θ ∈ {A,B} with q0 ≡ Pr(θ = B) = 12 = Pr(θ = A). A consumer with
type θ c.p. prefers product i = θ over i 6= θ, as specified below. Whereas q0 is common
knowledge, an individual consumer’s type and its valuations are ex ante unknown to
everybody.
After all prices are set, assume that the game proceeds as follows: Initially consumers
are neither informed about the existence nor the match value of the two products and
hence randomly visit a retailer. Once a consumer seeks advice at a retailer, the retailer
receives a private information about the consumer’s type. This information is captured
by the cumulative distribution function of the retailer’s posterior belief, G(q), with full
support q ∈ [0, 1]. As products A and B are symmetric, we naturally assume that q is
distributed symmetrically around 0.5. For convenience we stipulate that G(q) is twice
continuously differentiable in the interior; its density is denoted by g(q). We allow for
mass points at the borders 0 and 1. In Subsection 4.1, the size of the retailer specific mass
point is symmetric at zero and 1 and equals αk/2.23
A consumer of type θ who is matched by a retailer with the suitable product i = θ (a
“good match”) draws his retailer dependent valuations for that product vi,k, k ∈ {1, 2},
from a joint distribution with the density function h(vi,k, vi,−k). Instead, if the consumer
is matched with product i 6= θ, he draws a valuation of 0 with probability 1. Thus only
consumers who have been presented with a suitable product consider buying the product.
We assume that a consumer who has been presented with an unsuitable product stops his
search. This assumption is reasonable, for example, if asking a second retailer advice is
relatively costly for consumers. Moreover, if both retailers receive the same information
upon advising a consumer, the consumer can only get a different second advice if the
retailers use the information differently.
As there are two retailers, a mass of consumers of 4/2 = 2 visit retailer k. Each retailer
matches one product to each consumer in his shop. After the matching each consumer
buys one unit of the matched product at one retailer or nothing at all. We assume that
a consumer has no cost for obtaining information on the prices at both retailers once he
knows his preferred product. By this we abstract from modeling price search explicitly.
Low search costs for prices, once the product identity is known, are reasonable for example
if price information can be obtained on the Internet. The consumer buys at retailer k if
and only if vi,k − pi,k ≥ max(vi,−k − pi,−k, 0). Integrating this condition over vi,k and vi,−k
23The distribution G can equivalently be derived from Bayesian updating of the prior conditional on a
signal σ with informative conditional distributions Fi(σ|θ = i).
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yields the probability of a sale conditional on a correct match, which is given by
di,k =
ˆ ∞
pi,k
ˆ vi,k−pi,k+pi,−k
−∞
h(vi,k, vi,−k) dvi,−k dvi,k. (25)
This demand formulation has the property that demand decreases when all prices increase,
in particular ∂di,k
∂pi,k
< 0 and ∂di,k
∂p−i,k
> 0 where h is not zero.24 Our assumptions on higher
order derivatives, in particular, the negative dominant diagonal of the Hessian of di,k can
be met by choosing an appropriate density h. Demand at retailer k for product i equals
Mi, i.e. the mass of consumers who have been presented with product i and are of type
i, times di,k, the price-dependent sales probability of that retailer.
The product presentation boils down to each retailer choosing a threshold probability
sk, such that the retailer presents consumers with product A and for q < sk and with
product B for q > sk.25 The mass of consumers who are correctly matched with product
i by retailer k is thus given by
MA,k = αk + 2
ˆ sk
0
(1− q) g(q) dq, (26)
MB,k = αk + 2
ˆ 1
sk
q g(q) dq. (27)
Note that sk = 1 implies that the retailer informs all consumers about product A.
Half of these consumers are actually of type A this yields MA,k = 1. As vi,k does
not depend on where the consumer was advised, demand for i at k is given by Di,k ≡
[Mi,1(s1) +Mi,2(s2)] di,k = Midi,k.26 Note that Mi consists of the sum of the consumers
correctly matched with i at each retailer and thus satisfies Assumption 2. Mi,k and
hence Mi are monotone in sk as stipulated in Assumption 1, that is, ∂MA∂sk =
∑
k
∂MA,k
∂sk
=∑
k 2(1−sk)g(sk) > 0 and ∂MB∂sk =
∑
k
∂MB,k
∂sk
= ∑k 2 (−qg(q)) < 0. Furthermore, for a, b > 0
and interior sk ∈ (0, 1) (so thatMi > 0 ∀i), aMA,k+bMB,k is strictly quasi concave. In par-
ticular, it is strictly increasing for sk < aa+b and strictly decreasing for sk >
a
a+b . For a = b,
it is maximized at sk = 0.5. To see this, note that aM ′A,k + bM ′B,k = (a− (a+ b)sk) g.
In this context, λ as defined in (9) is a measure of information precision. Note that
∂
2
Mi( 12 ,
1
2 )
(∂sk)2
= −g as g′(12) = 0 by symmetry of G. Substituting the expressions just derived
into the definition of λ yields λ = 2 g(
1
2 )
Mi( 12 ,
1
2 )
. With better information, g becomes more
dispersed, that is, g(12) decreases, whereas Mi(
1
2 ,
1
2) increases when the more informative
q, i.e., those closer to zero and those closer to one are drawn more frequently.27 For
example, if the mass point αk increase and g is uniform in the interior, the density
decreases everywhere in (0, 1).
24This discrete choice demand is consistent with locally linear demand. Yet if h has full support,
demand cannot be globally linear in prices, see Jaffe and Weyl (2010) for a detailed discussion.
25There is no reason for a retailer to present product A to a consumer when he has a belief q′ > q and
B to a consumer with q.
26Though not necessary, this assumption greatly simplifies as retail pricing is independent of services.
27Cf. Ganuza and Penalva (2010) on information precision and Inderst and Ottaviani (2011) for a
similar application.
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In the main body of this paper we sometimes use an explicit formulation of MA and
MB that is derived under the assumption that G is uniform on (0, 1). Solving the integrals
in (26) and (27) for g = (1− αk) and summing over k directly yields
MA = α1 + (1− α1)2
(
s1 − s21/2
)
+ α2 + (1− α2) 2
(
s2 − s22/2
)
, (28)
MB = α1 + (1− α1)2
(
1/2− s21/2
)
+ α2 + (1− α2) 2
(
1/2− s22/2
)
. (29)
Moreover, if G is uniform, Mi, Mi,k and aMA,k + bMB,k (with a, b > 0) are strictly
concave for sk ∈ (0, 1).
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